Security by any other name: Negative security, positive security, and a multi-actor security approach

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GUNHILD HOOGENSEN GJØRV

Abstract. This article examines the challenges and contradictions between some of the leading conceptions of security within the field of International Relations (IR), from those stating that the concept can only be employed by the state with regard to immediate, existential threats, to those that see security as the foundation of social life or as a human good. This article continues a discussion that has taken place in the Review of International Studies regarding the development of positive security, examining the potential use of the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ security to bring clarity to these diverging security perspectives and to argue for a multi-actor security approach. It is argued that positive security perspectives, which rely on non-violent measures, ensure an emphasis upon context, values, and security practices that build trust, and by use of a multi-actor security model, shows the dynamics between state and non-state actors in the creation of security.

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Security is achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have the freedom to identify risks and threats to their well-being and values (negative security), the opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in concert with other actors (positive security).¹

This article examines the challenges and contradictions between some of the leading conceptions of security within the field of International Relations (IR), from those stating that the concept can only be employed by the state with regard to immediate, existential threats, to those that see security as the foundation of social life or as a human good.² As noted by Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, ‘international security studies is a field where there is little genuine engagement across the traditionalist/

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widening-deepening divide’. I believe that the concepts of positive and negative security can contribute to encouraging more engagement between the security divide. The notions of positive and negative security first and foremost relate to the way in which security has been conceptualised and how scholars and practitioners themselves place a ‘value’ on security. Negative security relates to the treatment of security as a concept we wish to avoid, one that should be invoked as little as possible. We value it negatively, or it is understood to represent a negative value. On the other hand, security has also been known to represent something that is positively valued, or as something that is good or desired. It is a good which provides the foundation to allow us to pursue our needs and interests and enjoy a full life. Rarely do we attempt, however, to understand these two valuations of security in relation to each other, or what this valuing process means to our use and understanding of the concept. This valuing process often lies beneath the discomfort that appears in the so-called traditionalist/widening-deepening debate. The Review of International Studies has previously provided a venue for discussing the notion of positive security. I hope to contribute to this discussion by building upon the potential use of the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ security, and to further bring clarity to diverse security perspectives and encourage better dialogue and engagement over ‘the divide’ through a multi-actor security approach.

Negative security can be understood as ‘security from’ (a threat) and positive security as ‘security to’ or enabling. In this sense, the positive/negative distinction reflects the sort of distinction Isaiah Berlin introduced when referring to negative and positive freedom – freedom from, and freedom to. We can understand security in a similar way. Negative security is often associated with “traditional” security, rooted in assumptions about a universally defined state and security issues, addressed by a universally agreed upon tool of security – the military. I wish to argue, building upon the works of Paul Roe, Bill McSweeney, Rita Floyd, Kirsti Stuvøy, and my own,

that positive security addresses important gaps not addressed by negative security, demanding an examination of how security is produced, by whom, and upon which epistemological foundation (in other words, what basis of knowledge informs that understanding of security). The ‘whom’ (actors) must be further supplemented by three variables – the nature of the practice of security (how), the context of the security practice (where), as well as the values lying behind these practices (why). A multi-actor-based approach to security brings negative and positive security into ‘the same room’, so to speak, combines both state and non-state actors, encouraging a negotiation between potentially competing security agendas within a given context.

Bill McSweeney and Paul Roe have contributed significantly to the development of the positive security concept. McSweeney claims that positive security focuses on human needs, and such that the notion of security brings comfort: ‘It is this human sense of security, embodied in the primal relationship, which, it will be argued, carries a profound message for our understanding of international security and security policy’.\(^8\) McSweeney grounds his analysis in ontological security or the routinised care for everyday, human needs. In other words, routine, the mitigation of chaos, provides ontological security for individuals and communities and thereby provides positive security. As such McSweeney’s conception of positive security mirrors human security. Roe builds on this work by pushing the criteria that makes positive security ‘positive’. Roe claims that positive security has application beyond just individual needs, and should also be applied to the state. He further argues that the determination of positive security needs to be based upon values of justice. Roe argues that ontological security alone does not suffice, as routines can be based upon relationships with enemies and threats (thereby entering negative security terrain), as well as with friends that create comfort.\(^9\) Rita Floyd also enters the discussion by framing a debate between the ‘overly negative conception of security’ of Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School (examining processes of securitisation), and the ‘overly positive conception of security’ of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones and the Welsh school (security as emancipation).\(^10\) Floyd argues for a consequentialist approach that assesses the results of a securitisation move or an act of security as to ‘how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question’.\(^11\) Floyd’s approach calculates consequence on the basis of whether one action has better results than the alternative, thereby ‘valuing’ the consequences.

The efforts of Roe and McSweeney demonstrate the relevance of a multi-actor approach but they each set their focus primarily on one particular level (individuals or the state). Floyd’s focus remains on the state level. The potential relevance of how these levels speak to each other has not yet been adequately explored. Roe does make an explicit link between the two levels by stating that the ‘promotion of human and minority rights’ by states necessarily intertwines the security interests of both state and individuals, but this reflects a one-way process where the state supports a passive referent.\(^12\) As well, we need to examine the implications of ‘just values’ and their relation to positive security. How are values of justice shared between and

\(^8\) McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, p. 15.
\(^11\) Ibid., p. 338.
among states and individuals? As Roe states, these values are those that are ‘inter-subjectively established by most states in the international system’. The challenge is sharing or negotiating these values between different actors, as well as how a justice-based positive security reflects back onto negative security. Where does this leave negative security – valueless? Justice free? Roe tentatively raises this concern by mentioning humanitarian intervention at the end of his article, demonstrating that the dividing lines between negative and positive security on the basis of justice are not always so clear. Some core distinctions between positive and negative security, not just values, but the epistemological foundations of each (fear or enabling), the security practices (violence vs. non-violence), and the actor (state or non-state) that is creating security.

My own work on positive security has been inspired by human security literature as well as gender security studies. Human security focuses upon the individual instead of the state as the security referent, which makes the approach appealing for its recognition of individual, ‘everyday’ security concerns, making individuals relevant and visible, and listening to marginalised voices. In this way human security shares many concerns with gender security approaches. There have been extensive debates as to how far one can go to ‘define’ human security, who defines it, and what does it imply for the ‘security provider’, which is often perceived to be the state.

I have attempted to work with the above insights from negative and positive security, resulting in a multi-actor, practice-oriented security framework. This framework reflects the tensions and dynamics between positive and negative security, prioritising actors, practice, and context. The framework demands a closer look at security practices, on both the discursive and ‘physical’ or active planes, including practices of people or communities that produce security, and how practices are operationalised in both the negative and positive security spheres. Despite the recognition in critical security studies that non-state actors and context matters, it has struggled to make the theoretical speak to the ‘real world’. The work in gender security studies (including gendered human security perspectives) has been useful in this regard, making strong links between the empirical and theory.

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13 Ibid., p. 789.
18 Hansen, ‘Security as Practice’.
An actor-based model of security includes both positive and negative security perspectives (which might be complementary or competing), and includes the positions of various actors from the policymakers and the military (which are traditionally ‘thrown together’ to represent one actor, the state), to communities/populations, NGOs/business/interest groups, media and research. As well, this model places the narrow, state-centric understanding of security in relation to other actor perspectives, illustrating the narrow and specific role it plays in the greater security picture, and exposes its limitations. Lastly, by focusing on context, the model and the positive security concept allows for a historicised and evolving concept of security as opposed to an ahistorical, reified notion.

Negative security: a uni-actor approach?

Negative security is often associated with the dominant perceptions of security prevalent within realism in the field of IR, often called ‘traditional security’. Negative security employs an epistemology of fear, focused on the identification of threats and the use of violence, which in turn informs the understanding and practice of security. An epistemology of fear grounds itself in attempts to know and objectify death, to make it concrete, so that threats and enemies can be identified. It is the security of survival. ‘Knowing’ death, however, is universalised in negative security, as is the approach to conquer or postpone death. The identification of danger and enemies (that which will cause death because we now ‘know’ it concretely), serves to legitimise or justify the use of force. It locates practice in violence, and as a consequence reduces the possibilities for recognising multiple actors because we do not want multiple actors employing violence, hence the monopoly of force that is located in the state.

Thus negative security has been dominated by a ‘uni-actor’ approach, whereby the term ‘security’ ought to be a limited, one-actor, state-centric concept as it invokes the deployment of the most extreme measures (usually the military) to address issues of immediate and existential danger. To call this a ‘uni-actor’ approach is in fact a misnomer – within the ‘one actor’ that is the state, there are contending actors that vie for position, including different policymakers and the military itself – they do not always reflect one and the same position. However, in ‘traditional’ conceptions of security, multiple actors within the state are nevertheless erased and represented as one. The result is a narrow or limited understanding of security that privileges...
one specific understanding of the state. This version of security has at least three consequences:

1. it attempts to make the concept manageable and precise, but at the expense of context
2. it assumes a predominantly linear, one-way relationship between the security actor and a passive security referent
3. it disables discussions about the limited role of the state in its ability to create security (particularly relevant for fragile and/or failed states).

An ahistoricised, decontextualised negative perception of security has dominated the twentieth century and more particularly the Cold War. Its pre-eminence has remained due to a certain logic connected to the definition – the state itself is expected to provide security to other actors, such as individuals and communities, what one could call ‘trickle down’ security. The potential uniqueness of community values and interests for security become subsumed within the universalised state. Security is decontextualised by defining it from the position of the abstract ‘state’, whereby characteristics for the state unit are normatively and prescriptively determined, including what the state fears and does not. Issues of security thus become concerned with the ‘phenomenon of war’, and the ‘threat, use and control of military force’.

Even after the end of the Cold War, advances in security studies that attempted to break beyond the narrow bounds of this abstract conception of security have found it very difficult to move beyond. As Rita Floyd notes, the critical security approach developed by the Copenhagen School (securitisation) has not moved beyond a negative security perception, demonstrating that negative security is not restricted to a traditional security approach alone.

The human security debate has been particularly interesting in this regard. Human security attempts to address the gap when the state does not nor cannot always ‘step up to the plate’ in its obligations for maintaining security for its ‘contents’ (people) – in other words, security is not ‘trickling down’ as the negative security concept would ideally assume. However, little satisfactory and concrete has been achieved, at least within the mainstream discussions about human security.

Some important exceptions here come from the gender literature on security, including human security. This is noted in numerous articles including Mohammed Nuruzzaman, ‘Paradigms in Conflict: The Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism’, Cooperation and Conflict, 41:3 (2006), pp. 285–303. 26


Thus one inevitably encounters the complaint that widening an already abstract and universalised definition renders the concept meaningless and analytically empty. Widening a definition of security that is to be operationalised by only one actor causes big problems. This also prevents some human security advocates from moving any further beyond their own rhetoric.  

A response to the conundrum of generating a meaningless concept is to restrict it. As McSweeney notes, proponents of a narrow version of human security focus on ‘freedom from fear’ as their guiding principle, in other words, they operate very much in the domain of negative security, epistemologically rooted in conceptions of fear, danger, and death. As also noted by Peter Burgess: ‘Human security is more often defined negatively in terms of threats, risks or violations than for what it might mean in positive terms’. This human security perspective is reflected in state-based approaches found in the Responsibility to Protect documents, or the Human Security Report, for example. This view of human security renders the individual referent as passive, and the state as active, using whatever means necessary including military to ensure human security. This is not to say that state intervention on behalf of human security is somehow ‘bad’, it is sometimes necessary. Thus, negative security cannot be solely equated with traditional security. It embraces perspectives to be found in critical security studies like the Copenhagen School, as well as in human security studies. By the same token then, human security cannot be directly equated with positive security.

Even though it is possible to expand our understanding of negative security, on its own it neither enhances our understanding of security nor ‘solves’ a number of core security issues. A significant problem with negative security is that a focus on fear and threats to the state ignores discussions about in/security amongst other actors and how they operate outside of fear and force, or respond to the fear and force of the state. When the state invokes security-producing measures to protect the state, these same measures may or do have a deleterious affect on other actors, like individuals and communities, who may feel inclined to respond to ensure their own security.

Negative security does not adequately enhance our understanding of in/security within differing contexts, where the employment of force may not play a role in

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creating security but rather humanitarian aid, community activism (environmental, gender, identity, etc.), or economic stimulation may play a far more significant role. Because of the dominance of the state in negative security, it also renders passive any possible agents of security outside of the state. This is a crucial omission to an understanding of security perspectives and security creation from non-dominant (in this case non-state) actors.

At the same time there exists not only an intuitive logic that suggests that security is much more than that which is embodied in a negative security approach, but also an increasing array of literature that argues for a less restricted concept, not least found in critical security studies, gender and security studies, and human security literature. The original meanings of security suggest something that is more comforting and enabling rather than rooted in fear: ‘security – from the Latin securitas – refers to tranquility and freedom from care, or what Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends’. Security is relevant to feelings of safety and stability, routines, or rather, security of expectations, whereby we can count on certain things for our future, that which we most value, upon which we can build capacity. Thus, there exists a parallel discussion to negative security that security and or the process of security is somehow a desirable ‘thing’ or good, and that it is relevant not just to the state but to different units, not least individuals.

It is becoming increasingly clear, not least by the experiences of the penultimate tool of security (the military) that negative security alone does not reflect the needs in reality. Depending on context, practices and values, increased insecurity is the result of ignoring other actors instead of recognising their roles in the security dynamic.

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37 The Copenhagen School provides a good example of this in their argument for privileging the state as a security actor. The critical security approach does recognise other actors, but due to the prominence of the state as a security actor and its use of force, other actors are minimalised. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

38 Hoogensen and Stuøy, ‘Human Security, Gender and Resistance’.


42 McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*. Bill McSweeney accounts for how the word security, both as noun and as verb, has changed in usage over the centuries, and how the noun developed to be synonymous with defence.
Positive security – towards a multi-actor approach

Positive security demonstrates that security is not solely about fear or the use of force. Positive security, following McSweeney, is an understanding of security that is based on an epistemology of enabling. It creates ‘secure spaces, building capacities and capabilities, and enabling’, it is about ‘producing’ security, and it is ‘the maintenance of just, core values’. A central foundation for enabling or the creation of security is trust. McSweeney discusses the role of trust briefly, acknowledging the linkage between ontological security and trust whereby trust is relational and generated by daily routine. It ranges from trust established between children and their ‘parental figures’ to the collective trust populations have to society and to each other. ‘Everyday’ security assumes the existence of trust created through good governance, respect for the law, cooperation, and an open society. Nils Bubandt also notes the importance of the ‘creation and maintenance of social bonds’ as central to security. Positive security research additionally asks how, for whom, and by whom security is produced, exposing the values and contexts behind practices of security. An epistemology of enabling opens the field of practice beyond violent means, thereby exposing not only many more actors but also a diversity of practice. It prioritises non-state actors, attempting to ‘know’ security that affects of individuals everyday.

Positive security has much in common with some of the human security literature that recognises individuals and communities as security actors. These actors endeavour to seek security, not just in relation to avoiding threats, but also to building their capacities. Because individuals and communities are allowed into the security acting sphere, these practices of security are often considerably different than that of states, where the use of force is the central tool of security. Many of the practices to avoid threats and build capacities are non-violent in character, including measures ranging from humanitarian and development aid, to economic, education, environmental, and other social network supports. Even when the state disappoints, individuals and communities often resort to non-violent practices to ensure security, building upon whatever resources they might have at their disposal at the time. In this respect, where the practices of negative security are predominantly associated with force, the practices of positive security are dominated by non-violent means.

Enabling can be externally induced (NGOs assisting local populations) as well as already exist (amongst locals themselves, for example) in different contexts. This applies to individuals and communities that must find ways to establish security directly after a natural disaster (flood, earthquake) before external assistance arrives, to women moving out of situations of abuse, to indigenous peoples protecting their

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47 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests.
48 Ibid., p. 155.
traditions and values in relation to changes in climate and surrounding society. However, as Bubandt argues, the parameters of security are necessarily context dependent, as there are ‘different ways of imagining and institutionally maintaining political communities’.

The importance of context, values, and practice

Although numerous scholars mention the relevance of context, there has been little discussion about what its implications for understanding security. In other words, context, or ‘facilitating conditions’ have been undertheorised. Negative, uni-actor security is constructed upon an ahistorical, acontextual approach to understanding security. At best, the context of a uni-actor approach is one of ‘abnormal’ politics connected to the existential/physical survival of the state. The uni-actor approach assigns an abstract definition of security as the independent variable that, through its restrictive focus on the existential survival of an abstract unit (the state), limits the dependent variables (context and actors), and therefore cannot envision threats or security practices in ways that evolve with specific histories, cultures, values, and priorities.

A positive security approach turns this on its head, where context becomes the independent variable, and the definition of security the dependent variable. The context determines the parameters or boundaries of what is, or is not, a part of the security dynamic at that time and place. The actors within a given context are most capable of arguing for or against a perception of security or insecurity within that context. But part of the problem, the biggest hurdle, is for most of these actors to be seen and heard.

This is not a search for ‘total’ security, but for an understanding of security that enables people to deal with risks and challenges that can never be predicted or even eradicated, and may even make life more interesting. Through positive security, people in specific contexts are recognised as potentially having some significant resources to tackle challenges and risks.

After setting the stage where we establish the context in which security is understood, we must then understand what are the values or priorities within this context that plays a role in defining security. Security is both about identifying the threats to those things we value, and the practices we use to protect the same. Threat perception is related to the perceived magnitude of loss of that we value.

Values inform security but not all values are just or positive according to Roe. Values inform the practices of the diverse actors that may be relevant in the context in question. Where Paul Roe sees values, particularly values of justice, informing practices of positive security, Rita Floyd adds value to practice after the fact.

55 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests.
employing the adjectives ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ after the securitisation process has taken place as a consequentialist classification and evaluation of security practices.\textsuperscript{57} If a securitisation leads to a ‘good’ result, this makes it an example of positive security. The challenge is how to determine ‘good’. Positive equals ‘good’. Positive equals ‘just. Does this mean that negative equals ‘bad’ and/or ‘unjust’? This is sure to engender mixed feelings amongst those who are practitioners within negative security, that is, the military. Is negative security inherently bad? Because of the use of force? The use of violence is generally not associated with that which is ‘good’, as noted in critiques of militarisation, or critiques on civil-military interaction.\textsuperscript{58} Arguments of justice (human rights, not least) might be used to support the use of military and force (à la Roe) but the consequences of the military action might be valued negatively (à la Floyd). In the end, both of these approaches need to be weighed out and negotiated within the specific context by the relevant actors.

We need to dig more deeply into the values that are embodied within negative security practices, not least to see what values might be shared between positive and negative security despite two epistemologically different departure points. In this case, human security approaches or the Copenhagen School that share similar epistemologies with negative security nevertheless embody values of justice, human, and minority rights. Their practices and epistemologies reflect negative security (employing measures of force), but the values offer a bridge to positive security practices as well. Positive security and negative security might both be driven by values of justice. We see this frequently occurring in Afghanistan regarding discussions about the impacts of the war upon civilians, where the military practices are presented as ‘just’ by the intervening forces and troop contributing nations, or consequentially ‘unjust’ or negative by civilian organisations (NGOs). The reality is not so simplistic, and requires input by more actors, not least local communities, in determining both the values that drive the practices as well as valuing the consequences thereafter.

Thus understanding both positive and negative security requires a three stage process: (1) the recognition of actors, practices, and the specific context; (2) the epistemological foundation of the practices; and (3) the values associated with those practices. The first stage attempts to ascertain what sort of capacities different actors already bring towards producing security, while stage two looks at assumptions behind the practices employed. Stage three determines what type of justice is relevant, but ideally one that seeks increased enablement across as broad a spectrum of actors as possible – moving towards (if not becoming) a more democratic principle of enablement.

The notion of ‘practicing’ security engages the ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘how’. It demands a strong empirical component in informing our understanding of security – what, exactly are actors doing? This needs to be more effectively mapped and analysed. Some analyses still remain at the level of elite actors (state and non-state), examining the management of security through governance for example, while others have begun approaching communities and/or individuals to contribute to our understanding of.

\textsuperscript{57} Floyd, ‘Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security’.

security.\textsuperscript{59} It has become clear that the expectations placed upon policymakers to ‘solve’ security is both unrealistic and impossible, but that they are instead part of a security dynamic between actors where there should be stronger coordination of practices when there needs to be. The challenge is to then identify what role these actors play, as well as the other actors, in that security dynamic. In fact, recognising and working with the synergy between security actors can minimise the need to resort to negative security practices (employment of violence). The stronger the collective trust (via methods of cooperation, political engagement, debate, and dialogue) the less need there is for surveillance, armed guards, and barricades.\textsuperscript{60} Traditional security approaches have suffered from ‘security anxiety’, driving states to devote disproportionate levels of resources towards a militarised response for the prevention, preparation or practice of war, which in many cases generates greater impacts than the actual conflicts themselves. Broadening the understanding of security compels academics and practitioners to evaluate the security implications for sometimes competing and conflicting security actors and referents, some of which argue for non-militarised practices, thereby mitigating against the ‘security anxiety’ created by focusing on just one referent and one practice.

**Actors in focus: relations between positive and negative security**

Security does not depend on only one actor in particular, but on relations between actors. The relations between actors of security take place within a security dynamic, and through these relations we see conflict/cooperation between actors, power between them, and the potential for inclusion or reconciliation of various security perspectives within a specific context. This potentially ‘democratises’ the practice of security, which in and of itself has an emancipatory effect, allowing previously marginalised voices to be heard throughout the process. However, this process does not reject a state-based, or negative, security perspective, but includes all actors articulating and practicing security as positive or negative.

Positive security attempts to make these relations clear and visible, in particular in relation to negative security, which has dominated and ‘hidden’ other actors. It challenges the notion that discussions about actors in security are only about ‘referents’, rendering passive the role of actors other than the state. A clear distinction is made between those actors who have the ‘legitimacy’ to declare a security threat, and those actors who are subject to the threat (the referent). Securitisation theory, for example, renders the referent as a passive object in the securitisation process.\textsuperscript{61} Further, although Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde discuss actors (the military, policymakers, firms, etc.) within the various sectors of security they present, they do not link or make visible the connections between these actors through a model or


\textsuperscript{60} These tensions between negative security approaches – increased militarised measures including barricaded government buildings, armed guards, surveillance, etc. – and positive security approaches that attempt to increase societal trust through political engagement and dialogue, have already been made clear in the ways in which Norway has handled the attacks of 22 July 2011. It remains to be seen what sort of balance between negative and positive security will result.

a process that recognises that they, depending on the context, affect each others’ perceptions of security and practices of security. When speaking about environmental security for example, these authors note the roles of various actors involved, including environmental activists, as well as state, elite policymakers. At the same time, the authors assign ‘roles’ to these actors that naturalises, normalises and disguises the power relations between actors, and assumes a state-based prioritisation of values to which all actors are submitted. A multi-actor approach focuses attention to the legitimacy of multiple actors in a specific context, instead of assuming an all-encompassing legitimacy for one actor in all contexts, as negative security has tended to do.

A common response to allowing for more actors, and more contexts, is that this widens the concept of security so much that it means everything. That is not the intention here. The context determines the nature of our understanding of security, and in each context, different actors may be relevant. Environmental security often draws on different actors (environmental policymakers, researchers, media, environmental NGOs, etc.) than does national security perspectives (drawing on military, foreign and defence policymakers, media, humanitarian NGOs, etc.). The security questions are different, the treatments will likely be different, but they nevertheless debate the core priorities and values that we wish to retain for the future.

This means that women, minorities, communities, research establishments, NGOs, and activists all have the potential to be legitimate security actors depending on the context. In fact, it is not even a question that these other actors have the ‘potential’ to be security actors, as they are indeed practicing security in so many different contexts. Negative security however has been unable or unwilling to see these practices, or acknowledge the importance of these practices to the nature of security in general. Security is thus a process that is multi-actor based, created and maintained both through formal institutions as well through informal (or rather, largely unrecognised) networks of varying scales. Despite the possible prioritisation of certain values amongst more powerful actors (such as certain policymakers), these values might nevertheless lack resonance with potentially impacted community actors and have little or nothing to do with their preferred approach to producing security.

The current climate security debate exemplifies this very well. Researchers and analysts in this context are a direct part of the securitisation process, and their ability to play into this process has nothing to do with whether they are a state or not or a government elite, but in their legitimacy within their professional field. As such, the model designed here attempts to incorporate the insights from work that has already recognised the benefits and necessity of ‘listening’ and understanding security ‘from below’, or from non-state actors.

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63 Bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security’.

A critical model of security needs to take into account therefore not just the assumptions of elites (dominant) in identifying in/security challenges (either for the state, for individuals, or for both), but also other impacted or impacting actors (non-dominant). In the following framework, various actors, from communities/individuals to researchers to policymakers and military actors and business/industry express perceptions of threats and assess their capacity to cope with them or address these threats. The named categories are not isolated from each other but are both implicitly and explicitly linked. The state is included as policymakers and military (whereas the Welsh School, and a more exclusively ‘human security’ approach may be seen to exclude or reject the state position). This does not mean that the military and policymakers are the leading actors of providing or identifying security, or need to intervene at all levels of identified human in/security, however they can act as important conduits for the facilitation of knowledge between communities and actors, as well as respond to human in/securities when communities need to be heard or can no longer effectively respond to threats. Thus, the model reflects both negative and positive security perspectives. But now they lie in an open forum where the perspectives can confront one another, instead the one dominating the other. I have tried to illustrate this by use of two figures.

Figure 1 illustrates the negative security, uni-actor approach, merging state policymakers and military (as a tool of the state) as the one state actor. Policymakers dictate the identification of threats and respond with a defence of the state, usually using the military at some stage if the state is acutely threatened. There is little to no room for expressions of threats by other actors in non-state contexts, also excluding any possibility for state actors to better understand and/or complement or support actions of security taken by other, non-state actors. Instead, state security perspectives interact only with each other in a ring of exclusivity.

Figure two conceptualises a security framework that allows other actors to participate – not excluding the state but acknowledging the realities of security today whereby non-state actors are very active in both creating security and insecurity alike. A larger focus is placed on non-elite actors. The marginalisation of other than state actors has been recognised as being ill-conducive to the creation and/or maintenance of security, a recognition that remarkably finds some of its strongest advocates within the traditional framework – the military. Today’s military and

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65 The following model is based on an initial multi-actor framework that was, since 2004, initially developed under the International Polar Year project ‘The impacts of oil and gas activity on peoples of the Arctic using a multiple securities perspective’ (2007–2012). The model has since been influenced by empirical work in the IPY project, CREN project on civil-military relations, as well as discussions with the researchers at the Human Security Program, University of Tromsø. See further: Hoogensen and others, ‘Human Security in the Arctic – Yes, It Is Relevant’.

66 See, for example, Ken Booth, ‘Security and Empancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17 (1991); Floyd, ‘Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security’. Note too that the military and policymakers, though acting on behalf of the same state, are not to be conflated as one-and-the-same actor as they may not hold the same security perspective (see Durant, The Greening of the US Military).


68 Hoogensen, ‘Gender, Identity, and Human Security: Can We Learn Something from the Case of Women Terrorists’.

humanitarian interventions are, to have a hope of supporting security practices in host countries, more and more dependent upon multiple actors participating in the creating and sustaining of security through fostering development and governance (in other words, economic, political, personal, community, health, food, and environmental security). Even a traditional security tool is currently very preoccupied with finding out how to best facilitate cooperation with other actors to ensure the creation of a safe and secure environment.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{70} These attempts and their developments can be followed through the various combinations, manifestations and permutations of civil-military cooperation, articulated at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, known as CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation at NATO), CIMCoord (Civil-Military Coordination),
This multi-actor security model attempts to reflect the influences locally, nationally, and internationally whereby the categories include local or international representatives. The model privileges human/individual security (we need to know more about ‘average’ people!) but necessarily includes state and global security interests to create an image of security that is more accurate and complete than that which we obtain if we only look to one actor of security (that is, the state). The ‘categories’ of actors are rough and broad, representing very diverse groups. The ‘who’ of these categories depends on the context (from conflict in Afghanistan to climate change in the Arctic).

Operationalising the model

There are distinct power relations between the actors also determined by context. For example, the military might dominate discussions about physical security in a remote village in Iraq (although this does not mean local perceptions are not taken on board), while at other times non-military actors dominate such as in the provision of humanitarian aid. In Norway today different responses to the terror attacks on 22 July 2011 abound, ranging in discussions about increasing physical security around government buildings and amongst its people, to using love and openness to make society more secure.71 In other words, within given contexts we see different security practices, from the delivery of aid, to debates about national responses to terror. Ideally, all actors have lines of communication to the others, but this has a lot to do with practices and how the different security perspectives are articulated (through speech acts, through images, through physical action, through institutions) and understood. The ability for different perspectives to interact with others depends on the context and the engagement of the different actors, not least placing demands on certain actors as conduits, including and but not limited to research, policymakers, and media. A discussion of the multiple security challenges of climate change in the Arctic in Norway might include very different actors than the same discussion taking place in Russia, where actors are constrained or empowered in different ways. The linkages between these actors also does not suggest that the security perspectives of each set of actors will not come into conflict, or that one category of actors does not, in some ways, create insecurity for another(s). The purpose of the model is not to create some sort of idealistic love-in where there is consensus at all times, but to make visible competing security perspectives within one context, upon which possible compromises and solutions can be based.

This model implies a methodological leap for the researcher as well. The researcher moves from being the observing analyst identifying security moves, to an

71 Mona W Clausen, ‘Danskene Har Startet Debatten Norske Politikere Venter Med (the Danish Have Started the Debate That Norwegian Politicians Continue to Wait for)’, Aftenposten (2011); Marie Melgaard and others, ‘Med Fakler Og Roser Gir Vi Verden Beskjed. Vi Lar Ikke Fryktten Knekke Oss (with Torches and Roses We Send the World a Message. We Do Not Let Fear Break Us)’, Dagbladet (2011); Mathias Vedeler, ‘Sikring Av Gaten Var Forsinket (Securing the Street Was Delayed)’, Aftenposten (2011).
active participant in the security discussion, acting as a conduit for community interests and values (through research methods like surveys and interviews), as well as a source of ‘objective information’ and analysis. Floyd envisions a similar process emerging, where the analyst steps ‘into the security equation and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others’.72 As Kirsti Stuvøy argues in her own work on the Russian crisis centres as security actors, it is important to establish both a subjective and objective picture of security. In Stuvøy’s work she cites and expands upon the following insight from Vincent Pouloït: ‘Objectifying subjects’ knowledge is means ‘to learn something other than what agents already know by connecting subjective meanings with context and history’.73 ‘The practice of objectifying is required in order to avoid taking subjects common sense as the sole basis of reasoning’.74 Stuvøy notes that human security, though it takes its departure point in individual and community based security perspectives, ‘suffers from an apparent schism between objectivism and subjectivism’ whereby the subjectivity of the individual is not contextualised. She emphasises the roles of context and history as important qualifiers to establish a counter-balance of objectivity (against the subjectivity of the individual) for understanding what security means.

This means much more visible and concrete engagement between actors and not least researchers – first finding out who the possible actors are (from communities and individuals, to researchers, military, media, etc.), observing, discussing, and understanding the security practices of these actors, and within that context assessing and valuing the security动态 as processes of negative or positive security. The researcher or security analyst, in fact, cannot disassociate from her work in identifying securitisations, and must accept, through self-reflection, that she has a role in the process and discussion about security. That the analyst and researcher plays a role in the process not only needs to be acknowledged through self-reflection, but should be acknowledged as a part of the process. We see this particularly now in environmental issues, with the extensive scientific engagement in climate change and the social impacts of this, including in terms of security.75

Security is a negotiation between the state and individuals – negative security assumes that negotiation is largely complete, whereby the state addresses security. Positive security sees the context based needs of individuals, the extent to which trust is present, and attempts to reveal those who are left out of the state apparatus or who may not have the same values and fight for other values. These individuals are more visible in failed states than in non-failed states.

Multi-actor security for civil-military operations

This multi-actor security approach argues for a change in the way that we understand security, insofar as we ought to understand it according to context, multiple actors, and their practices. That we ‘ought’ to understand security in this way is not just a normative wish, but a reflection of the empirical realities facing security

74 Ibid.
practitioners, from the military actor, to the climate change scientist. In the next two sections I will present the example of military operations as well as perceptions of security in the Arctic to demonstrate the ways in which the multi-actor security framework represents dialogues and dynamics of security in very different contexts.

The military have generally operated in the sphere of negative security. Security understood as the military protecting the state against threats is often a key argument against widening as it possibly implies unrealistic expectations on the state and the military to ‘solve’ all issues of security. Keeping security to a simple and elegant relationship between a state and its military is very difficult to maintain however, particularly today where militaries are deployed into complex operations where multiple actors are active. Today the state is competing for attention as a key actor in conflict, reconstruction, and stabilisation.

Responding to crisis situations, whether they stem from humanitarian, man-made or natural causes, exceeds the coping capacity of any single agent or institution. Since the 1990s military and civilian actors have been responding to global disasters or conflicts, leading to multi-actor interaction. The military function for civil military interaction (called CIMIC) lies at the nexus between reflecting, facilitating and at the same time challenging an operationalisation of a multiple-actor security agenda. Many militaries still articulate a negative conception of security but practice a multi-actor approach, largely out of necessity, but without the realisation of what this implies for our understanding of security. The function of civil-military interaction is an explicit acknowledgement that security cannot be established through force (read violence) alone, and that other participants and non-kinetic (non-force) activities are equally crucial if security is to be established. As such, it is a central empirical basis from which security studies can continue to learn and develop, as well as provide critical, relevant feedback and advice to policy that pertains to militaries, but also to other multi-actor security contexts.

Broadly speaking, civil military interaction refers to those relations either between military and civilian institutions (such as non-governmental organisations or NGOs, or governments and their departments, etc.) and local populations. This is applicable to both the relations between militaries and the citizenry within the same state, or those relations between a ‘foreign’ military and a ‘local, host population’ and various civilian institutions, usually in international peace operations or complex emergencies. Of interest here is the interaction between foreign militaries, humanitarian agencies, and the local populations for whom they are ideally meant to provide security. Michael Pugh defines this aspect of civil-military relations broadly, stating that it consists of ‘relations between external military forces and internal civilian authorities or society; between internal regular or irregular forces and external civilian agencies; and between the external military and civilian components of interventions’. This relationship is not uncontroversial, where there are many different national and

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foreign militaries working together with many national civilian organisations and populations in complex conflict zones.

Thus civil-military interaction exposes multiple actors who are all vying for a voice in creating security, either for the state, or for local communities, or for more specific interests (specialised NGOs for example). These actors do not all agree on what is needed, they do not share assumptions, values or epistemological foundations which inform their practices. Militaries practice security in large part through violence and force (kinetic operations), and do so on the basis of a negative security perception, but at the same time, as the function of civil-military interaction demonstrates, more than force is needed to create security. Aid, in the form of humanitarian support, development, infrastructure, and governance are all necessary components towards providing a dependable security. Ideally the military will not engage in these other security practices, but they nevertheless need to be aware of them, ensure that their operations will not jeopardise other security practices, or at least coordinate efforts with these other elements of security if the kinetic operation is to have any effect at all.\textsuperscript{78}

This takes us into the three-stage, multi-actor security process, where practices of security are based on different epistemological foundations and reflect different values, and can come in conflict with one another. Concerns have been raised regarding, not least, military incursions upon areas that have been traditionally civil domain and ‘divisions of labour’ between militaries and civilian organisations, the use of ‘humanitarianism to justify military action, the presence of militaries and attacks on civilian organizations, identification of combatants and non-combatants, information sharing between civilian organizations and military, armed escorts of civilians, and so forth’.\textsuperscript{79} Additional concerns include the balance between local ownership of security production and the imposition of external forces and/or military forces, the ability of external forces to support local efforts in meaningful and productive ways, and the extent to which external forces further disrupt patterns of social cohesion within and between local communities and civilian organisations in times of crisis.\textsuperscript{80}

The core challenge is that multiple actors are affected by the security practices of others, and not all actors act ‘naturally’ in concert. But they must pay attention to each other and negotiate a security process that can address most concerns. This is easier said than done. In the case of Afghanistan for example, the international efforts there to support the national Afghan government are in part based upon a structure of civil-military interaction called the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). This structure consists of a combination of civilian (often ministerial) and military. This approach implicitly (if not explicitly) assumes the necessity of humanitarian, development, and governance aid towards creating security, and is thus

\textsuperscript{78} This is reflected in the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Doctrine that has informed military practices in both Iraq and Afghanistan.


\textsuperscript{80} Donini, ‘Local Perceptions of Assistance’.
designed to ensure that as many of the necessary players of security are involved. Even then, success is tenuous, and it is clear from the different approaches taken by each PRT in Afghanistan that there are many different assumptions behind how the balance between civil and military efforts is to be operationalised, and whose values and epistemological foundations will inform the dominant security practices. Nevertheless, there is still a strong assumption that this balance, however it is achieved, is necessary in ‘asymmetric’ or ‘irregular warfare’ (state vs. non-state actors).\footnote{COIN manual; ILO report} This is particularly relevant to states with weak or missing governance structures that cannot take a lead role in security.

Without the consent of the local population, without their trust, and their stamp of approval that demonstrates the legitimacy of the desired security picture, security will not be attained. This is precisely the struggle we see on the ground in Afghanistan now. Inroads by the Taliban do not occur solely on the basis of their sheer military and violent strength – it also depends on the support they are able to muster, by whatever means possible (similar to the ‘hearts and minds’ employed by militaries), within the local population. This is also very clear with regard to the role of women as security actors. In a context where women have little access to public spaces and official sources of power (although this varies according to region), they must nevertheless find ways to support their families and communities. Despite obvious personal dangers, more women than ever before stood for election nationally, they are taking the risks to support girls going to school, and find ways to contribute economically through improving skills.\footnote{ILO report on gender equality, CAI and sewing centres.} On a broad, national level, the power of women is still very low, but it is not always the case within families, and within the household. The recently introduced phenomenon of ‘FETs’ or female-engagement teams demonstrates an increasing acknowledgement that information and power lie behind the closed doors where women are, and that these same women are a source of outreach for the powerful militaries in their attempts to contribute to stabilisation.\footnote{Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, ‘Woman to Woman: A New Strategy in Afghanistan’ (NPR, 2009); ibid.}

Developments in the military show that knowing security from only the negative security perspective does not suffice. Security necessitates drawing our attention towards multiple actors. Contributions of the various actors are diverse and not always consensus-based. Conflict arises between the actors, and the power relations between them will say a great deal about what sort of security picture may result, making it all the more important to expose these relations and evaluate them for what they are, if not try to influence them towards a more human security-based, just picture.

**Multi-actor security and climate change in the Arctic**

But let us shift contexts. We now move our focus to a very different setting, the Arctic, which has often been relegated to the periphery in world politics, meaningful only as a region of security during the Cold War.\footnote{Nıels Einarsson et al. (eds), *Arctic Human Development Report (Ahdr)* (Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004).} Security considerations in the Arctic have been traditionally dominated by geopolitical perspectives that further
informed national security agendas focused on territorial integrity of the state through political and military means. Insofar as the traditional security approach affected the Arctic, it was as an early warning zone for incoming missiles (between the USA and the Soviet Union), or as in the case of Iceland and Greenland, 'stepping stones' of security between Europe and North America. In fact, if the Arctic had any meaning to security at all during the Cold War, it was as a military 'theatre' for the USA and Soviet Union and their nuclear arsenals, as well as nuclear targets.

Thus, 'security' has long been relevant here. However, particularly since the end of the Cold War, military participation has been far less overt. The focus has been on cooperation, building trust and security frameworks are considered undesirable, representing a militarisation of the region. This is because when security is articulated, it is still very much a negative, uni-actor approach. Human security, taken also from a uni-actor, negative perspective, has not been considered relevant here as governance structures are considered to be generally strong, attending to the basic human needs of Arctic citizens (although not for all). A negative security perspective increases the fear of militarising the region unnecessarily, while at the same time eliminates the ability of other actors to express their concerns and values in the languages of security.

The Arctic is politically complex, governed between eight sovereign states with complex, multi-ethnic populations (Russia, Canada, USA, Norway, Sweden, Denmark (Greenland), Finland and Iceland), five of which have coastlines on the Arctic Ocean (not Iceland, Sweden, or Finland). Almost all of the eight states that govern the Arctic are partially or mostly located outside of the Arctic region and have their political centres far to the south of the region. This centre-periphery relationship within the different Arctic nations has not been insignificant politically, as the region has either been exceptionally ignored (centre-dominant politics) or been suddenly subject to considerable attention (Norway’s recent Strategy for the High North, for example).

One might argue that in the Arctic, there is a case for maintaining a negative security approach, whereby the only need to talk about security is in the context of state preservation or the protection of Arctic state borders. Otherwise, due to strong governmental structures, security (human security) for individuals and communities are addressed by the state. But in this context, we also see it is necessary to have a multi-actor security approach, not least to mitigate against militarisation and hyper-securitisation whereby security consists of a hunt for an ‘enemy’ against which the state needs protection.

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89 See recent newspaper discussions regarding security in the Norwegian North, including perceptions of Russia: Brigt Dale and Berit Kristoffersen, ‘Fare I Nord (Danger in the North)’, Aftenposten (15 October 2010); Gunnar Thorenfelt, ‘Nato-Leder Advarer Mot “Kald Krig” I Arktis (Nato Leader Warns against Cold War in the Arctic)’, Dagbladet (12 October 2010); Paul Arthur Berkman, ‘Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean: Promoting Co-Operation and Preventing Conflict’, Whitehall Papers (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2010).
The Arctic region almost by definition, or rather, lack of definition, demands a multi-actor security perspective. Its geography is shifting, consisting mostly of water as it is predominantly an ocean with a changing ice structure, surrounded by eight states. This is not a typical definition of a region, which is traditionally determined by state boundaries. In fact, because the Arctic is not defined by state boundaries, there is little agreement on what the boundaries of the Arctic actually are. Regional security in this context is not defined by tidy national borders, and by some definitions, does not even exist. In some respects, allegiances between Arctic communities are stronger across the borders than with communities within the constructs of the states these communities are beholden to.

This region, given the lack of clarity surrounding its boundaries, might necessarily be subject to a more demanding narrow, negative security approach that concentrated on the perceived vulnerability of this lack of clarity. However, this is not the case, despite the wealth that exists in the region (oil and gas, and fisheries). Security is provided by multi-actor mechanisms, like UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, whereby the latter includes representation of all eight Arctic nations, as well as indigenous representation. Unclear boundaries have been a ‘fact of life’ in the North, including between Norway and Russia for more than forty years, even during the Cold War. Trust, through various forms of cooperation, influence nations that ‘naturally’ should have had significant conflict with each other.

Thus, while the eight Arctic states have considerably divergent internal politics, even when it comes to their ‘piece’ of the Arctic, they have at least agreed to some important governance mechanisms between them that focus on the Arctic. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) functions as a basic policy and governance structure for the Arctic, with all states having signed onto the convention, and all but one having ratified it (the United States). UNCLOS is an important tool of trust operating at the state level. In 1996 the Arctic Council was established under the Ottawa Declaration, including the eight Arctic states as members, but also including Permanent Participants consisting of indigenous representatives. The Arctic Council is designed to promote ‘cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic’. The construction of the Arctic Council demonstrates an awareness of the importance of more than just a state-centric view about the Arctic, and that community interests need to be heard. The Arctic Council is particularly interesting as it is mandated to not address matters of security. This is security understood negatively however. The Council’s focus on environmental issues, sustainability, and the protection of communities in the North demonstrate that in fact this body operates in many ways

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90 Einarsson et al. (eds), *Arctic Human Development Report.*
92 Inuit Circumpolar conference, Pomor trade, Calotte, Barents region.
93 Mari Torsdotter Hauge, ‘Enige Om Delelinje I Barentshavet Etter 40 År (Agreement on Demarcation Line in the Barents Sea after 40 Years)’, *Aftenposten* (27 April 2011).
in the sphere of positive security. This is demonstrated not only by the state and non-
state actor members and observers (including NGOs), but also by key mechanisms of
the Council, the ‘Working Groups’, and scientific and technical expert groups that
are mandated to inform the Council on monitoring the Arctic, contaminant issues,
conservation, and protection of flora, fauna, marine wildlife, sustainable development,
as well as rescue operations. By no means perfect (open dialogue can still be restricted
as evidenced by struggles over issues on oil and gas development), but nevertheless
functioning and continuously developing, the mechanisms of the Arctic Council
allow for non-state voices to meet state voices through meetings/discussions and
reporting, which further are intended to inform policymaking throughout the region.
However, more work needs to be done here. States represent the more powerful
voices, although indigenous peoples have full and active participation on the
Council. Russia continues to have an ambivalent relationship to the Arctic Council,
warly of engaging any issue of strategic importance. At the same time, the strength
of cooperation engendered by this and other institutions in the Arctic cannot be
ignored, as it has created a trust between actors whereby expected ‘realist’ behaviour
of the Russian state is replaced by a ‘legally correct and diplomatically impeccable
approach’, while at the same time Canadian scholars recommend the Arctic
Council as a venue for rather ‘traditional’ security concerns, that of territorial
disputes.

This is also reflected in the processes towards self-governance that are taking
place in the Arctic, from indigenous parliaments (the Saami Parliament), to devolu-
tion of power to specific territories or regions (Nunavut in Canada) and land claims.
The strength of non-state actors in the region is exemplified by a number of negotia-
tions with indigenous peoples regarding energy and land use.

While states still bristle about sovereignty issues (Canada’s claim on the North-
west Passage as internal waters, Russia planting a flag on the Arctic Ocean bottom
in August 2007, or the controversies surrounding the jurisdiction around Svalbard
and the fisheries zone), we see multi-actor security issues coming more to the fore in
the form of oil and gas potential in the region. Energy security (reliable sources of
energy at reasonable and stable prices) is the new name of the game, where states
are still active players, but now large, multinational oil companies are visibly play-
ing. Statoil, Gazprom, ExxonMobil and Imperial Oil, to name a few, all have vested
interests in developing oil and gas resources in the Arctic, and work closely with
governments not least to extol the virtues of drilling both on and offshore in the
region. It is to this region that the USA is increasingly looking as a source of oil to
reduce its dependency upon the Middle East, seeing the dispute between Norway and
Russian as a ‘security issue’. However, Russia and Norway have recently demonstra-
ted that even the controversial demarcation of territorial waters which has a

95 Elana Wilson Rowe, ‘Policy Aims and Political Realities in the Russian North’, in Elana Wilson Rowe
(eds), Russia and the North (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009).
97 Janice Gross Stein and Thomas S. Axeworthly, ‘The Arctic Council Is Best Way for Canada to Resolve
98 Berit Kristoffersen and Stephen Young, ‘Geographies of Security and Statehood in Norway’s ‘Battle of
the North’’, Geoforum, 41:4 (2009).
99 ‘Gas fuels new cold war in the Arctic’, Scotland on Sunday (4 June 2006) available at:
{http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=824612006} accessed 31 March 2007.
significant impact on the two countries’ access to the estimated vast oil reserves, is not constrained by a narrow geopolitical perspective.

However, not only governments and oil companies are part of the energy security picture, as Arctic communities themselves have stakes in the ways in which these resources are being developed, either by benefitting from oil and gas development economically, or by voicing concerns from an environmental and societal security perspective.100 These voices must also be heard in relation to the energy and environmental security discourses reflected at elite (state) levels. Both former governor Sarah Palin (her now famous ‘Drill baby, drill’ still ringing in the ears), and former Alberta premier Ed Stelmach’s promotion of oil and gas development (not least the controversial oil sands in Northern Alberta, in Canada’s sub-Arctic) set their sites on North American energy security as well as the American and Canadian economies. Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg recently exclaimed that extraction of Norwegian oil and gas resources was necessary towards acting responsible in light of climate change. The melting ice has exposed the multiple players in the field (states, companies, environmental organisations, individuals, and communities) as the linkages and tensions between energy, environmental, economic, societal, and human security become more clear.

By invoking a multi-actor security perspective, the security politics of the Arctic region are made accessible to Arctic communities, not just elites reigning from the south. It recognises the efforts of local communities attempting to secure their own values and priorities, either in concert with or despite of pressures from other actors (central governments, industry, etc.). Security in this context does not necessarily present a picture of consensus, as these different actors will be practicing security according to their own priorities. However, making visible these practices, acknowledging the legitimacy of different actors in different settings, noting that a uni-actor approach is difficult just due to the nature of the region, means that the multiple agendas and concerns can be better heard as responses to energy and military security rhetoric, and can work towards maintaining a trend of cooperation in the region, despite the ambiguities of borders and natural resource claims that could otherwise heighten tensions.101 Security in the Arctic is very much dependent upon different mechanisms of cooperation that instil trust between actors.

Conclusion

The purpose of presenting this model is not to argue how security should be practiced, but often how it is practiced. A multi-actor security framework allows us to observe and assess what practices between actors appear to succeed in given contexts, and what processes fail.

A multiple security perspective makes the practices of individuals and communities visible to the political world – it makes issues like vulnerability, adaptation and

100 These ‘local’ or community voices are coming more and more to the fore through the research and reports conducted through the Arctic Council, through the International Polar Year (2006–2008) initiative, as well as through various Arctic NGOs and scientific organisations such as the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) and the International Arctic Social Science Association (IASSA).

resilience more easily understood in a political context. It raises community issues up closer to ‘high politics’ by engaging the security discourse, while at the same time reduces a militarised approach to security (community approaches, human security, often does not require a military solution – quite the opposite actually – it exposes such solutions for what they often are, and that is as greater threats to human security). This approach requires engagement – that is, the willingness to be a part of the dialogue and take part.

Understanding security as positive and negative as presented here does raise further important questions. If justice is important to positive security, what values are important in negative security? Can values be shared between positive and negative security even though their founding assumptions (epistemology) differ, as do their practices? How can we account for non-state actors in negative security? This is a very difficult question as it addresses a reality of non-state actors responding to fear and using force, but acknowledging these practices as security actors can be problematic. A uni-actor ‘traditional’ security approach recognises the state as the sole security provider in part because if security practices inevitably involve force and militaries, we want to limit the number of actors with that sort of capacity. Does recognising the use of force by non-state actors legitimise them at the same time? These are only some of the questions that can and should arise for future research on the implications of positive and negative security conceptions.

It is nevertheless crucial that the security concept is taken beyond a fear-based, military-as-solution concept. If not, too much weight and responsibility is placed on the military, and taken away from other actors who in fact play a central role in creating and sustaining security. This is clear from international operations and in the processes of civil-military interaction, as well as in the context of the Arctic where multiple security issues cannot be addressed by such a narrow approach.